Abstract. There is significant current interest in type-free systems that allow flexible self-application. Such systems are of interest in property theory, natural language semantics, the theory of truth, theoretical computer science, the theory of classes, and category theory. While there are a large variety of proposed type-free systems, there is a particularly natural type-free system that we believe is prototypical: the logic of recursive algorithms. Algorithmic logic is the study of basic statements concerning algorithms and the algorithmic rules of inference between such statements. As shown in [1], the threat of paradoxes, such as the Curry paradox, requires care in implementing rules of inference in this context. As in any type-free logic, some traditional rules will fail. The first part of the paper develops a rich collection of rules of inference which do not lead to paradox. The second part identifies traditional rules of logic which are paradoxical in algorithmic logic, and so should be viewed with suspicion in type-free logic.
Introduction
In second-order logic, one distinguishes between two types of objects. First-order objects are the basic objects of interest. Second-order objects are the properties and classes, the functions and operators for the first-order objects. There are, however, situations in which this division is unnatural. When one wants, for whatever purpose, to mix the first-order and secondorder universes, one is reminded of the reasons for their original separation: the paradoxes.
This paper is a study in type-free logic. The goal of type-free logic is to find consistent, natural, and flexible ways to handle type-free systems where the second-order objects are not separated from the first-order objects, but are in some sense part of the first-order universe. In type-free logic one desires enough flexibility to including meaningful self-application and selfcontainment: functions and properties should be able to apply to themselves and collections should be able to contain themselves. One also wants natural or "naïve" comprehension and functional abstraction principles to create collections and functions. One might also want a truth predicate.
Standard ZFC set theory fails these desiderata. Functions may be applied to functions, and collections may contain collections, but within limits: a function cannot be a member of its domain and a collection cannot contain itself. In ZFC only a well-behaved, well-founded part of the secondorder universe is allowed inside the first-order universe. In fact, due to well-foundedness, the set-theoretic universe can be regarded as a typed theory where the universe is typed by ordinal rank. Meaningful self-application is blocked: the relation x ∈ y is automatically false unless x has a lower ordinal rank than y. ZFC does not allow a universal set (and even extensions of ZFC such as GB or MK class theory do not allow a universal class that contains the universal class). A typical example of the limitations of ZFC in this regard concerns the status of the self-composition function T : given a function f with domain and codomain the same class, defined T f to be f • f . This natural function is not an object in the ZFC universe.
1 Now there is nothing preventing one from studying T in set theory, but the point is that it is external to the set-theoretical universe V , a universe intended to be rich enough for all of mathematics. This example is not atypical. Set theorists work outside of V whenever properties about the intersection ∩ or union ∪ operators are discussed: the set-theoretical operators ∩ or ∪ are not themselves objects of the set theoretical universe V .
Whenever a type-free system is considered with more expressive power than ZFC set theory, for example a system with unrestricted comprehension, the threat of paradox emerges anew. So some part or another of the traditional logics must be restricted. Nevertheless, there is significant current interest in type-free systems due to applications in property theory, natural language semantics, the theory of truth, theoretical computer science, the theory of classes, and category theory. In property theory, it is desirable, indeed arguably essential, that every open formula in a language should determine an associated object called a property. There should be a truth predicate that behaves in a manner similar to the truth predicate in natural language. In class theory there should be nothing preventing a class from containing itself. In fact, any restriction on class comprehension seems artificial.
2 There should be a universal class, and this class should contain itself. And given its role as an organizing principle of contemporary mathematics, there should to be a more satisfying way to develop category theory than by employing the current large/small category distinction.
There are a large variety of proposed type-free systems 3 which are provably free from contradictions engendered by paradoxes, and which restrict 1 Of course, restricted versions of T can be defined to apply to functions on a fixed domain.
2 This is in contrast to sets where good conceptual reasons have been given to restrict the comprehension principle. 3 Recent examples include [6] , [11] , and [3] . Recent examples from the substructural tradition include [14] , [4] , [8] , and [15] . See the bibliographies of these works for earlier examples. The articles in [9] , especially those by A. Cantini, S. Feferman, H. Field, H. Friedman, H. Sturm, and K. Wehmeier, show the contemporary interest in type-free systems and in strong forms of comprehension and abstraction.
the traditional logics in one way or another. What remains is the question of which type-free systems are the most compelling. One obvious criterion is that a type-free system should not introduce artificialities worse that the artificiality, discussed above, of separating first-order objects from secondorder objects.
In this paper we introduce a promising methodology for developing a natural type-free system. Perhaps the most common strategy is to start with some form of a classical logic with a naïve comprehension principle, then to weaken it until it is consistent. But herein lies the problem: it is unclear what to weaken. Our strategy, on the other hand, is to begin with a naturally occurring type-free system then to investigate the logical properties it in fact possesses. The hope is that this naturally occurring type-free system will serve as a fruitful model for strong type-free systems more generally.
Perhaps the most natural type-free system is ordinary language, but for our purpose it is hopelessly intractable. The universe of recursive algorithms, however, is both natural and tractable. If we fix a framework for algorithmic description, then self-application of algorithms is possible, indeed commonplace. If we focus on logical operators that can be defined algorithmically, a rich type-free logical structure emerges. Algorithmic logic is the study of this type-free system. This paper is the second of a series designed to introduce and examine algorithmic logic. The first [1] , a short and informal introduction to the subject, focussed on the challenge of the Curry paradox. The Curry paradox is the first test of any type-free system containing implication. The present paper builds on the lessons learned from the first, but is independent of it. It begins the formalization and careful study of algorithmic logic. The main task here is to understand which traditional rules of propositional logic are safe and which are problematic in algorithmic logic. A third paper [2] will discuss the principle of unrestricted functional abstraction in algorithmic logic. Fredrick Fitch [7] sought a type-free logic with an unrestricted abstraction principle; he regarded any restriction on abstraction as artificial and undesirable. Since algorithmic logic is both type-free and allows for a strong abstraction principle, our work can be viewed as part of the Fitch-Curry-Myhill tradition. 4 
Algorithmic Logic
The basic objects of algorithmic logic are algorithmic statements. An algorithmic statement is an assertion of the form algorithm α with input u halts with output v. The assertion 4! = 24 can be understood as a true algorithmic statement, where the algorithm is one designed to calculate the factorial function, the input is 4, and the output is 24. 4 We recommend [10] , [5] , and [3] as interesting introductions to type-free logic. We have found [13] to be a helpful introduction to the substructural tradition.
Algorithmic statements can be more subtle.
5 Consider Goldbach's conjecture that every even number greater than two is the sum of two prime numbers. The negation of Goldbach's conjecture can be understood as the algorithmic statement that Goldbach halts with output 0 when run with input 0, where Goldbach is the algorithm that checks each even number in turn, beginning with four, and outputs 0 if it ever finds a number that cannot be represented as the sum of two primes. Note that if Goldbach's conjecture is true, then the algorithm Goldbach will simply fail to halt regardless of input.
An algorithmic statement can be false in two ways. It can be false because the algorithm halts with an output different from the one specified. Such statements are directly false. Or it can be false because the algorithm fails to halt. Such statements are indirectly false.
The assertion that a specified algorithm halts on a specified input can also be understood as an algorithmic statement. Consider the algorithm halt that takes as input a pair [α, u] and runs as a subprocess the algorithm α with input u. The algorithm halt outputs 1 if the subprocess halts; otherwise halt itself does not halt. So the algorithmic statement asserting that halt outputs 1 on input [α, u] is true if and only if α halts on input u.
The algorithm halt is an example of an algorithmic predicate, a predicate that can be represented by an algorithm that outputs 1 if and only if the predicate is true of the input. We require that if a predicate algorithm halts at all, it outputs 0 or 1. Algorithmic predicates are the basic internal predicates of algorithmic logic.
There is an internal truth predicate true for algorithmic statements. The algorithm true expects as input a triple [α, u, v] representing an algorithmic statement with specified algorithm α, specified input u, and specified output v. First true runs the subprocess α with input u. If this subprocess halts with output v, then true outputs 1. If the subprocess halts with output not equal to v, then true outputs 0. If the subprocess fails to halt, then true also fails to halt.
Closely related to the truth predicate, is an algorithmic predicate corresponding to directly false. Because of the halting problem, however, there is no algorithmic predicate corresponding to false: the external property of being false is one that cannot be expressed internally.
Finally, algorithmic connectives can be defined in terms of algorithmic predicates. The algorithmic conjunction ∧ and disjunction ∨ behave as expected, but the algorithmic conditional ρ ⇒ requires special care. Here the conditional is indexed by a library ρ of inference rules. The algorithmic statement A ρ ⇒ B means that the algorithmic statement B can be deduced from the algorithmic statement A using the rules in the library ρ. Because 5 In this paper algorithms will be limited to recursive algorithms. With this restriction, the collection of algorithmic statements can be seen to be in some sense equivalent to the collection of Σ1-statements in first-order arithmetic.
of its definition, the connective ρ ⇒ can be used to define an internal predicate prove ρ . The connective ρ ⇒ is also used to define negation ρ ¬ . Since algorithms can take algorithms as input, as in the case of halt above, algorithmic logic is inherently self-referential and so is essentially type-free. Consequently, special care must be taken to avoid contradiction: the rules of the library ρ must be carefully evaluated for validity. Indeed, in an earlier paper [1] we show that the rule modus ponens for ρ ⇒ cannot be included in a sufficiently rich library ρ without rendering the rule itself invalid. If modus ponens is included in such a library, an algorithmic version of the Curry paradox results in a contradiction.
The first part of the present paper introduces rules for algorithmic logic that form a stable base: a collection of rules that can be safely extended to form stronger valid collections. The second part of the paper presents a list of paradoxical rules: traditional rules of logic that can be shown to be invalid when in a sufficiently rich library, usually through arguments akin to those found in the Russell and Curry paradoxes.
Conventions for Algorithms
Rather than stipulate a particular theoretical framework for the discussion of algorithms, we require that a suitable framework behaves as follows.
Anything that can be input into an algorithm is called a datum. Data include natural numbers and algorithms. In addition, if a 1 . . . a k are data, the list [a 1 , . . . , a k ] is itself a datum. Every algorithm accepts exactly one input datum and either does not halt or halts with exactly one output datum. If an algorithm requires or produces multiple data, the data are packaged in a single input or output list respectively. Any datum is an allowable input whether or not it is consistent with the intended function of the algorithm. Typically, we will not specify what an algorithm does with an unexpected input datum.
Every datum has a positive integer size, and there are only a finite number of data of a given size. The size of a list is strictly greater than the sum of the sizes of the items of the list. A process is a pair consisting of an algorithm and an input. Every halting process has a positive integer runtime. If a parent process runs one or more subprocesses in its execution, then the runtime of the parent process is strictly greater than the sum of the runtimes of the halting subprocesses.
An algorithmic statement can be represented as a datum: If α is the specifed algorithm, u the specified input, and v the specified output, then the list [α, u, v] represents the corresponding algorithmic statement.
The identity algorithm identity simply outputs a copy of its input. The algorithmic statement [identity, 0, 0] is denoted T . This algorithmic statement is true. Similarly, the algorithmic statement [identity, 0, 1] is denoted F. This statement is directly false since 0 = 1.
Deduction
There is an algorithmic predicate for deduction. This deduction predicate depends on a library of rules instantiated by an algorithmic sequence.
Definition 4.1. An algorithmic sequence is an algorithm which halts for every positive integer input. If α is an algorithmic sequence, then α n denotes the output of α applied to the integer n.
Informally, a rule is an algorithm which expects as input a list of algorithmic statements which it treats as hypotheses. It seeks to generate statements which are logically entailed by these hypotheses. It outputs a list consisting of the input list together with the newly generated statements, if any. Some rules will require a resource integer m in order to limit the amount of time that the rule uses. Resource integers are important in order to allow different rules to take turns being applied by a supervising process. Finally, some rules depend on the choice of a library ρ, so in general a library (or at least an algorithmic sequence which the rule treats as a library) must be included in the input. A library is an algorithmic sequence ρ such that ρ n is a rule for all positive integers n.
As defined, a library is an infinite sequence of rules, but these rules are not necessarily distinct. In fact, any finite collection of data can be represented as an algorithmic sequence α by defining α n to be α N for all n ≥ N where N is the size of the collection. Thus the definition does not exclude finite libraries. Proof. Let S be the set of statements on H 0 , H 1 , . . .. The strategy is to show (i) the set of items of any particular H i is in the ρ-deductive closure (so S is a subset of the ρ-deductive closure), and (ii) S is ρ-deductively closed.
(i) By induction on i. The case i = 0 is clear. Assume that every item of H i−1 is in the ρ-deductive closure. If B is an item of H i , and if f (i) = (k, m), then B is a direct ρ k -consequence of the items of H i−1 . So B is in the ρ-deductive closure.
(ii) Suppose B is a direct ρ k -consequence of C 1 , . . . , C r ∈ S. We must show that B ∈ S. By definition, B is on the conclusion list obtained by running ρ k with input [H, ρ, m] for some integer m and some list H where every item of H is in the set {C 1 , . . . , C r }. By the mononicity requirement for rules, if H ′ is any list whose items include each C 1 , . . . , C r and if m ′ ≥ m then B is on the conclusion list when ρ k is run with input [H ′ , ρ, m ′ ].
Let i 0 be an integer such that C 1 , . . . , C r are all on H i 0 . There are an infinite number of pairs (k, m ′ ) with m ′ ≥ m, and all but a finite number are of the form f (i) for i > i 0 . Choose such an i. So B is on the conclusion list when ρ k is run with the input [ Proof. This follows from Lemma 4.11 and the definition of deduce.
In particular, if Γ ⊢ ρ B then any ρ-deductively closed set containing all the items of Γ contains B. (
(iv) Let S be the ρ-deductive closure of the items of Γ ′ . So every item C i of Γ is in S. Since Γ ⊢ ρ A and since S is deductively closed, S must contain A. Proof. The set of true statements S is ρ-deductively closed by Lemma 4.7. The result follows from Proposition 4.14.
Because deduce is an internal predicate representing deduction, one can use ⊢ ρ to define a conditional connective ρ ⇒. (A material conditional →, not dependent on deduce, will be defined in Section 12). The algorithm deduce can also be used to define an internal provability predicate prove ρ .
The above results, restated in this notation, yield the following. 
Transitivity Rule
In the next several sections eleven inference rules will be introduced. These rules will be used to form a stable base (in the sense of Definition 13.1). The first is an internal implementation of Proposition 4.18(ii). Proof. The ρ-validity of this rule follows from Proposition 4.18(ii).
Rule 1. The Transitivity Rule is an algorithm that implements the
rule diagram A ρ ⇒ B B ρ ⇒ C A ρ ⇒ C .
Universal Rules
Rule 2. The Universal Rule is an algorithm that generates all true algorithmic statements. More specifically, assuming the input is of the expected form [H, ρ, m], the Universal Rule outputs a list consisting of H appended with all m-true algorithmic statements. An algorithmic statement B is mtrue if (i) the datum B has size at most m, (ii) the runtime of the associated process is at most m, and (iii) B is true. Proof. Every true algorithmic statement is m-true for some m. So the ρ-deductive closure of any set contains all true statements.
Corollary 6.3. If the library ρ is valid and contains the Universal Rule, then an algorithmic statement A is true if and only if prove ρ (A).
So, in algorithmic logic, there is a sense in which internal deduction is complete for any valid library containing the Universal Rule. By Proposition 13.7, however, there is also a sense in which algorithmic logic is inherently incomplete. The Meta-Universal Rule is the first rule whose validity is contingent on the contents of the library.
Proposition 6.4. If the library ρ contains the Universal Rule, then the Meta-Universal Rule is ρ-valid.
Proof. This follows from Proposition 6.2. If Γ = [C 1 , . . . , C k ] is a list of algorithmic statements, then the conjunction
the conjunction is simply defined to be C 1 , and if k = 0 (so Γ is the empty list) then the conjunction is defined to be T . Observe that the conjunction C 1 ∧ · · · ∧ C k is true if and only if each C i is true. Similarly, the conjunction is directly false if and only if some C i is directly false.
Rule 4. The Conjunction Rule is an algorithm that simultaneously implements the following three rule diagrams:
More specifically, for any statements A and B on H, the Conjunction Rule appends A ∧ B to H. In addition, for any statement A ∧ B on the given H, the Conjunction Rule appends A and B to H. Several laws can be deduced from the above rules. This is the first rule we have considered where the validity of the rule is contingent on the validity of the library. If the library ρ is valid, then this rule is ρ-valid, but in Section 14 we shall see several examples of valid rules that cannot themselves be contained in a stable base (in the sense of Definition 13.1). Since the goal is to form a stable base of inference rules, we need something stronger than the above proposition. Theorem 9.5 is sufficient. Proof. Suppose to the contrary that ρ is not valid. By the previous lemma there are statements D and E such that D is true, D ρ ⇒ E is true, but E is false. Choose D and E so that the runtime r of the process associated with D ρ ⇒ E is minimal. 
Proposition 7.7. If ρ contains all the above rules, then
Proof. (i) Let S be the ρ-deductive closure of G∧(A∨B). We must show that C is in S. By the Conjunction Rule, G and A∨ B are in S. By the Universal Rule, G ∧ A (ii) This follows from Part(i) and Corollary 7.5(ii). 
Proposition 9.7. If ρ contains all the above rules, then
(i) A ∨ T ρ ⇐⇒ T , (ii) A ρ ⇐⇒ A ∨ A, (iii) A ∨ B ρ ⇐⇒ B ∨ A, and (iv) A ρ ⇐⇒ A ∧ (A ∨ B). (v) A ρ ⇐⇒ A ∨ (A ∧ B). (vi) A ∨ (B ∨ C) ρ ⇐⇒ (A ∨ B) ∨ C.(i) A ∧ (B ∨ C) ρ ⇐⇒ (A ∧ B) ∨ (A ∧ C), and (ii) A ∨ (B ∧ C) ρ ⇐⇒ (A ∨ B) ∧ (A ∨ C).
Proof. (i) By the Disjunction Introduction Rule
, A ∧ B ⊢ ρ (A ∧ B) ∨ (A ∧ C) and A ∧ C ⊢ ρ (A ∧ B) ∨ (A ∧ C). Now use Proposition 9.6(i) to show A ∧ (B ∨ C) ⊢ ρ (A ∧ B) ∨ (A ∧ C). The other direction is similar. (ii) Showing A ∨ (B ∧ C) ⊢ ρ (A ∨ B) ∧ (A ∨ C) is
Rule 8. The Meta-Disjunction Rule is an algorithm that implements the rule diagram
G ∧ A ρ ⇒ C G ∧ B ρ ⇒ C G ∧ (A ∨ B) ρ ⇒ C .
Proposition 9.9. If the library ρ contains the Universal, Conjunction, and Disjunction Elimination Rules, then the Meta-Disjunction Rule is ρ-valid.
Proof. This follows from Proposition 9.6(i).
Proposition 9.10. If ρ contains all the above rules, then
Proof. Let S be the ρ-deductive closure of the two hypotheses. By the Conjunction, Universal, and Transitivity Rules, T ∧ A One might expect the law A, ρ ¬ A ⊢ ρ B to hold. Unfortunately it often fails. The instability of the corresponding rule will be discussed in Section 14. 
Proposition 10.3 (De Morgan). If ρ contains all of the above rules, then (i)
For the other direction, let S be the deductive closure of 
Proof. (i) Use the Disjunction Introduction Rule.
(ii) One direction follows from the Disjunction Introduction Rule. The other direction uses Proposition 11.3(ii) and Proposition 9.6(ii).
(iii) This follows from Proposition 11.5(i), Proposition 9.11, Proposition 9.7(iii), and Proposition 8.2(iii).
(iv) Use the Disjunction Introduction Rule (twice), Proposition 11.3(i), and Proposition 9.6(ii) (twice).
(v) Use Proposition 11.3(i) to get A, −A ⊢ ρ B. Since A, B ⊢ ρ B, the result follows from Proposition 9.6(ii).
(vi) Use Part(v) to get A→C, B→C, A ⊢ ρ C and A→C, B→C, B ⊢ ρ C. Then the result follows from Proposition 9.6(ii).
(vii) This follows from Part(v).
The last three parts of Proposition 12.3 show that in some ways the material conditional → is stronger than the deductive conditional (ii) This follows from the Universal Rule, Proposition 11.3(ii), the Transitivity rule, and Proposition 9.10.
Proof. (i) By assumption
(iii) By the Disjunction Introduction Rule, Γ, −A ⊢ ρ A→B. We have Γ, A ⊢ ρ A→B by assumption and the Disjunction Introduction Rule. The result follows from Proposition 9.6(ii).
(iv) This follows from Part(iii).
(v) This follows from the Disjunction Introduction, Universal, and Transitivity Rules, and Proposition 9.10.
We mentioned above several tautologies of classical logic that do not hold in general for the algorithmic material conditional. When restricted to algorithmic statements that are true or directly false, however, the algorithmic material conditional can be expected to behave precisely as the classical material conditional. The following corollary illustrates this phenomenon.
Corollary 12.5. If ρ contain all the above rules, then
Proof. These follow directly from Proposition 12.4(iv) and (iii).
Stable Base
The eleven rules developed above are clearly not a complete collection of rules for algorithmic logic. Indeed, as will be seen in Proposition 13.7, one can never have a complete library of rules for algorithmic logic. Rather, the rules discussed so far provides a convenient stable base on which to build more elaborate stable libraries.
Definition 13.1. A base is a set B of rules. We require that a base be finite, or at least arises as the set of terms of a library. A B-library is a library containing all the rules of the base B. A B-library ρ is said to be valid outside B if every rule in ρ which is not in B is ρ-valid. A base B is stable if every B-library that is valid outside of B is itself valid.
Let B 0 be the set containing Rules 1 to 11 above. Proof. Let B be a stable base and B ′ a stable extension of B. Suppose ρ is a B ′ -library valid outside of B ′ . We must show that ρ is valid.
First we show that ρ is actually valid outside B. To that end, let ρ k be outside B. If ρ k happens to be in B ′ then it is B-safe by the definition of stable extension. In particular, ρ k is ρ-valid. If ρ k is outside B ′ then it is ρ-valid simply because ρ is valid outside of B ′ . Thus ρ is valid outside B.
Since B is stable, and since ρ is valid outside B, the library ρ is valid. Proof. Let mp(ρ 1 ) be the algorithm implementing
. This is a ρ-valid rule for any library ρ since ρ 1 is valid. 8 There is no algorithm that decides whether a statement is false. Thus there is a false algorithmic statement C such that C Now suppose that the rules of ρ 1 form a stable base B. Let ρ 2 contain all the rules of ρ 1 , mp(ρ 1 ), deny(C), and the Universal Rule. The new rules are B-safe, so the rules of ρ 2 form a stable valid extension of B. Finally, by an argument similar to the one above, ρ 2 is strictly stronger than ρ 1 .
Paradoxical Rules
A paradoxical rule is an algorithmic counterpart of a traditional rule of logic that cannot be in any stable base. 9 In this section we will show that the following are paradoxical rules:
P 2 :
ρ ¬ A ∨ B P 8 :
Given the expected input [H, ρ, m], all of the rules above use ρ, but only Rules P 2 , P 8 , and P 9 use the resource integer m in their implementation. The symbol ∅ in Rules P 8 and P 9 indicates that no premises in H are required. Clearly, some of the paradoxical rules above are interrelated. Rules P 1 , P 3 , P 4 , P 6 , P 7 , P 13 , and P 14 have the remarkable property of being ρ-valid for any valid library ρ but, due to their instability, not being in any sufficiently rich valid ρ. Rule P 2 has a similar status, at least for any B 0 -library ρ.
Remark. As one might expect, many of these correspond to rules that have aroused suspicion in the past and have been excluded from weaker logics such as intuitionistic or minimal logic. The long list of paradoxical rules 9 The term paradoxical is used since many of the arguments related to such rules are akin to those occurring in the Russell and Curry paradoxes.
to be avoided in algorithmic logic might make algorithmic logic seem weak. However, in algorithmic logic one always has the option of going to a stronger library ρ, often compensating for not having the above rules. 
More specifically, assuming an input of the expected form [H, ρ, m], the rule β looks for all statements of the form of the first line of either of the above diagrams, where α is required to be an algorithm. For each such statement it finds, it appends the appropriate statement to H. Clearly β is B-safe where B is the given stable base. Let B ′ be the stable extension of B obtained by simply adding the rule β to B. Given a
While the rule β used in the above proof is not a rule of elementary logic, and may thus seem ad hoc, it is a consequence of general, more natural rules concerning the basic properties of algorithms. This is discussed in [2] . Let S be the ρ-deductive closure of Q ρ . Since, Proof. Suppose that there is such a stable base B. The Universal and Transitivity Rules are B-safe, so the base B ′ that results from adding these rules to B is also stable. The Meta-Universal Rule is B ′ -safe since B ′ contains the Universal Rule, so the base B ′′ that results from adding the Meta-Universal Rule to B ′ is also stable.
Let ρ be a valid B ′′ -library and A a statement. Let S be the deductive closure of A and ρ ¬ A. By the Meta-Universal rule Proof. Suppose otherwise that there is such a stable base B. As in the proof of Corollary 14.7, there is a stable base B ′′ containing B together with the Universal, the Meta-Universal, and the Transitivity Rules.
Consider an algorithm β that expects as input Let ρ be the library consisting of this rule together with all the rules of B ′′ .
The B ′′ -library ρ is valid since B ′′ is stable. Let S be the deductive closure of R ρ . So R ρ ρ ⇒ prove ρ (F) is in S. By Proposition 6.5(ii), prove ρ (prove ρ (F)) is in S. Finally, by supposition, prove ρ (F) is also in S. We have shown that R ρ ρ ⇒ prove ρ (F) is true. Therefore, R ρ is true. Since ρ is valid, Proposition 4.18(iii) implies that prove ρ (F) is true. So by Proposition 4.18(iv) and the validity of ρ, F is true.
Conclusion
In [2] we introduce additional rules to algorithmic logic which do not concern logical connectives as do the rules in the current paper. Instead, these new rules relate to the basic structure of algorithms themselves. These structural rules will lead to a strong internal abstraction principle making algorithmic logic more flexible and powerful.
In particular, for bases B containing these structural rules, Lemma 14.1 can be strengthened to apply to all B-libraries ρ. Consequently, the main results of Section 14 can be significantly strengthened. More precisely, let B 1 be the stable base consisting of B 0 together with the structural rules of the promised future paper. Many of the results of Section 14 refer to laws which do not hold for all B-libraries. In other words there exists some Blibrary where the law fails. For the base B 1 , however, these results can be strengthened to assert that the given law fails for all valid B 1 -libraries.
In Section 14 above we mention that several of the paradoxical rules are ρ-valid as long as ρ is valid. The other rules, with one exception, cannot be expected to be ρ-valid. More specifically, if ρ is a valid B 1 -library, then all the other rules, with the exception of Rule P 5 , are not ρ-valid. This can be seen with arguments similar to those of Section 14. Rule P 5 is ρ-valid for such ρ, however, because of the striking fact that ρ ¬ ρ ¬ A is false for all A. This fact can be shown with an argument similar to that of Proposition 14.13. 
